How to protect individual privacy in public data is always a concern. For social networks, the challenge is that, the structure of the social network graph can be utilized to infer the private and sensitive information of users. The existing anonymity schemes mostly focus on the anonymity of vertex identities, such that a malicious attacker cannot associate an user with a specific vertex. In real social networks, however, each vertex is usually associated with not only a vertex identity but also a community identity, which could represent the private information for the corresponding user, such as the political party affiliation or disease information sensitive to the public. In this paper, we first show that the attacker can still infer the community identity of an user even though the graph is protected by previous anonymity schemes. Afterward, we propose the structural diversity, which ensures the existences of at least k communities containing vertices with the same degree for every vertex in the graph, to provide the anonymity of the community identities. Specifically, we formulate a new problem, k-Structural Diversity Anonymization (k-SDA), which protects the community identity of each individual in publishing social networks. We propose an Integer Programming formulation to find the optimal solutions to k-SDA. Moreover, we devise three scalable heuristics to solve the large instances of k-SDA with different perspectives. The experiments on real data sets demonstrate the practical utility of our privacy model and our approaches.
Introduction
Social networks represent social activities between individuals, where each individual is a vertex of a social graph, and the social activities are summarized by edges. Recently, more and more applications have emerged to leverage the information from social networks. However, privacy is recognized as one of the major concerns that deter the development of social-network based applications.
To address this issue, Backstrom et al. [1] pointed out that simply removing the identities of vertices cannot preserve the privacy. Accordingly, a few models have been proposed for providing protections in publishing social net- * Dept. of Electrical Engineering, National Taiwan University † Dept. of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago ‡ Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica § Dept. of Electrical Engineering, National Taiwan University works [10, 12] . The studies in [5, 7, 11, 13] consider the resistance of re-identification of each individual against attacks of various background knowledge. Against an attacker who knows the vertex degree of a target individual, Liu and Terzi in [7] extend the concept of k-anonymity [8, 9] in record data to propose the k-degree anonymity in structural graph. The k-degree anonymity requires that every vertex is indistinguishable with at least k − 1 other vertices given its degree. With a similar concept, privacy models called k-neighborhood anonymity [11] and k-automorphism anonymity [13] are proposed to protect against the attacks of sub-graphs related to each individual. Alternatively, Hay et al. [5] apply generalization techniques to provide protections. They hide privacy details about each individual by grouping a set of vertices into a super-vertex and infer the relationships between super-vertices from super-edges.
In the above works, each vertex is associated with a vertex identity, which could represent the user name, and the above works ensure the anonymity of vertex identities accordingly from various aspects. In real social networks, each vertex is usually associated with not only a vertex identity but also a community identity [4, 6] , which could represent the private information sensitive to the public, such as on-line political activity group, on-line disease support group information, or friend group in a social network.
The existing works aim at ensuring the anonymity of the vertex identity, but an attacker can still infer the community identity of an user according to the structure of the social network graph such as vertex degrees if the vertices belonging to the same anonymous set gather in the same community. In addition, it is also worth to mention that the community identity is different from other features such as gender and salary since the community identity could be implicit and derived from graph structures by community or cluster detection techniques. An attacker can thus reveal the privacy information, such as the neighborhood or connections, of a victim with only a little inaccuracy using degree attacks, if the vertices of the same degree gather closely in a subgraph (community) of the whole social network.
Consider Fig. 1 as an example of a published social network protected with the 2-degree anonymity. In the case of explicit communities, if an attacker knows John has 5 friends in the published social network, he can infer that John has AIDS since all vertices with the degree 5 are associated with the AIDS community. In another case of implicit communities (i.e., without explicit community label), by identifying the cluster or dense subgraph John resides, an attacker can infer the neighborhood of John with only a distance one inaccuracy in this case. This example illustrates that even though an attacker cannot precisely identify the vertex corresponding to the individual because of k-degree anonymity, private and sensitive community related information can still be inferred by degree attacks. In this paper, therefore, we formulate a new privacy problem for protecting the community identity of each individual in publishing social networks. For privacy preservation, we first propose k-structural diversity which requires that, for each vertex, there are other vertices with the same degree locating in at least k − 1 other communities, to protect against attacks of vertex degrees. The key point of kstructure diversity is that there should be at least k vertices of the same degree distributing widely apart from each other, no matter the community information is explicit or implicit. Afterward, we formulate a new problem, k-Structural Diversity Anonymization (k-SDA), which is to modify the social graph G to satisfy the k-structural diversity such that the semantic distortion is minimized. To solve the problem, we formulate k-SDA with Integer Programming to find the optimal solutions for small cases. Moreover, we devise three novel algorithms, EdgeConnect, CreateBySplit and MergeBySplit, to solve the large instances of k-SDA with different perspectives. The EdgeConnect algorithm anonymizes a social graph by avoiding removing the existing semantic information, such that the solution is always a super graph of the original graph with limited additional edges. EdgeConnect only adds edges to connect the vertices within the same community. However, we show that there may exist no feasible solution to k-SDA by merely adding intra-community edges. Therefore, we propose the CreateBySplit and MergeBySplit algorithms to create a few vertices by splitting the existing vertices, such that vertices can be flexibly anonymized into groups with new created degrees or the existing degrees. The experiments on real data sets demonstrate the practical utility of our privacy model and our approaches.
Note that k-SDA is different from the community detection problem [4, 6] in social networks, which is to find the community identity for each vertex, instead of providing the anonymity for the given community identity. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem formulation. Section 3 derives the Integer Programming model to obtain the optimal solution. Afterward, we propose three scalable algorithms in Section 4 and conduct experiments on real data sets in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
Problem Formulation
In this paper, we formulate a new anonymous problem, k-Structural Diversity Anonymization (k-SDA), to protect the community identities of individuals in a network. The network is represented as an undirected simple graph G(V, E, C), where V is the set of vertices corresponding to the individuals, E is the set of edges representing the relationship between individuals, and C is the set of communities. These communities can be either explicitly given as input or derived through clustering on the social network graph. Each vertex v has a community ID, c v , in C, and each edge in E can span two vertices in either the same or different communities. Let d v denote the degree of vertex v, and k-SDA is also given a positive integer parameter k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |C|, to represent the structural diversity, which is formally defined as follows.
e., satisfying k-SDA, if for every vertex v ∈ V , there exist at least k communities such that each of the community contains at least one vertex with the degree identical to d v .
In other words, for each vertex v, there must exist at least k − 1 other vertices locating in at least k − 1 other communities. Figure 2 shows an example with the graphs that are 2-structural diverse, where the community ID is indicated beside each vertex. In Figure 2 (a), both communities contain a vertex with the degree as 1 and a vertex with the degree as 2. Therefore, the graph is 2-structural diverse. In Figure 2 (b), two communities contain vertices with the degree as 1, and three communities contain vertices with the degree as 2. For each degree, we can find at least two communities containing vertices with the same degree. The graph is thus 2-structural diverse.
(a) (b) Figure 2 : Example of two graphs satisfying 2-structural diversity.
is k-structural diverse, then it also satisfies k-degree anonymity, which implies that for every vertex, there exist at least k − 1 other vertices with the same degree.
The problem is to anonymize a graph G(V, E, C) such that the graph is k-structural diverse. To limit the semantic distortion in the corresponding applications, we define two operations, Adding Edge and Splitting Vertex for graph anonymization. Operation Adding Edge connects two vertices belonging to the same community. Adding an edge for two vertices in different communities is prohibited because it may lead to improper distortion. For example, it is inappropriate to artificially connect an individual in the liberal political action community to another individual in the antiabortion community to achieve k-structural diversity. Operation Adding Edge alone can fulfill k-structural diversity in some cases. However, k-structural diversity cannot be achieved with only this operation in many instances. Consider the example in Figure 3 . There is one vertex with the degree as 3 in community 2. However, by operation Adding Edge alone, it is impossible to make any vertex in community 1 have a degree as 3 since there are only three vertices in community 1. Therefore, we also propose operation Splitting Vertex to ensure that every input instance can be anonymized to achieve k-structural diversity. For each vertex v in the operation, we substitute v in G with a set S v of substitute vertices, such that each substitute vertex is connected with at least one edge in E v , where E v denotes the set of incident edges of v in G. In other words, different from connecting unrelated new vertices, operation Splitting Vertex regards a substitute vertex as a clone for the corresponding individual, and each clone must present the relationship of at least one neighbor of v. In addition, every edge in E v must be incident to a substitute vertex in S v . Therefore, S v can include at most |E v | vertices. For the connectivity between substitute vertices, a simple approach is to enforce that all substitute vertices of v must be mutually connected. However, the clique induced by the substitute vertices can be used as a hint to identify the corresponding individual. Therefore, we do not restrict the connectivity between substitute vertices in this paper. In addition, operation Adding Edge allows a substitute vertex in S v to connect to any other vertex u in the same community. Therefore, the flexibility of the connectivity for substitute vertices enables us to fulfill the k-structural diversity for more input instances.
Actually, operation Splitting Vertex guarantees that every input instance can be anonymized to achieve k-structural diversity. In the worst case, every vertex v is replaced with |E v | substitute vertices, and each substitute vertex has only one incident edge. However, creating substitute vertices, together with adding edges, may lead to substantial semantic distortion in the corresponding applications. Therefore, the objective of k-SDA is to minimize the semantic distortion during the anonymization. Specifically, we formally define k-SDA as follows.
Problem k-SDA. Given a graph G(V, E, C) and an 
binary variable; θ c,d = 1 if there exists at least one vertex in c with its degree as d; otherwise In this paper, we set ω as |V | 2 (the maximum number of edges in a graph) to consider the case that operation Splitting Vertex is performed only if the graph cannot be anonymized with operation Adding Edge alone.
Integer Programming
In the following, we propose the Integer Programming formulation for k-SDA. Our formulation together with any commercial software for mathematical programming can find the optimal solutions, which can be used as the benchmarks for the solutions obtained by any heuristic algorithms. We first derive the formulation for k-SDA with only operation Adding Edge to capture the intrinsic of this optimization problem and to avoid including complicated details initially. Afterward, we extend the formulation to incorporate both op-erations in the appendix.
As an initial basis, consider the formulation for k-SDA with only operation Adding Edge. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the input and decision variables of k-SDA. In our formulation, e u,v and e v,u correspond to the same edge. The objective function of k-SDA with only operation Adding Edge is as follows,
The objective function minimizes the number of added edges. The problem has the following constraints,
where
Constraint (3.1) enforces that the degree of each vertex is unique, and constraint (3.2) prunes unnecessary candidate degrees for each vertex. The degree for each vertex u must be no smaller than the number of originally incident edges. In addition, it cannot exceed the sum of the number of originally incident edges and the number of adding edge candidates. Afterward, the left-hand-side of constraint (3.3) represents the degree of vertex u, and constraint (3.1) guarantees that δ u,d is 1 for only a single d. Therefore, constraint (3.3) together with constraint (3.1) ensures that binary variable δ u,d can find the correct degree of each vertex.
Constraints (3.4) and (3.5) collect the degrees of the vertices in each community. If the degree value of vertex u is p, i.e, δ u,p = 1, then constraint (3.4) states that the corresponding community must have at least one vertex with the degree as p, i.e., θ cu,p = 1. In contrast, for any other degree value q, q = p, constraints (3.1)-(3.3) ensure that δ u,q = 0 must hold. In this case, 0 ≤ θ cu,q must be true when θ cu,q is either 0 or 1. Note that this constraint does not limit the value of θ cu,d in this case. However, if the degree value of every vertex u in community c is not q, i.e., δ u,q = 0, then the right-hand-side of constraint (3.5) is 0 and thereby enforces that θ c,d in the left-hand-side must be 0. Therefore, constraints (3.4) and (3.5) ensure that binary variable θ c,d can find and represent the degrees of the vertices in each community.
Constraint (3.6) implements the k-structural diversity. Specifically, if community c has at least one vertex with the degree d, i.e., θ c,d = 1, then this constraint guarantees that there must exist at least k −1 other communities, where each of them also has a vertex with the degree as d. In this case, for each community c with θ c,d as 1, constraint (3.5) will assign the degree of at least one vertex u in community c to be d, and constraint (3.3) will then add several edges to u to fulfill the degree requirement. Therefore, constraint (3.6) is able to achieve the k-structural diversity in k-SDA.
To consider operation Splitting Vertex, one approach is trying to relax the above constraints by removing (3.1) and allowing δ u,d to be a positive integer variable, instead of a binary variable. In this case, each vertex u is associated with multiple degrees, where each degree is assigned to a substitute vertex in S u . However, constraint (3.3) is not able to guarantee that each substitute vertex has at least one incident edge in E u , and the edges between substitute vertices in S u are not considered, either. Therefore, we incorporate operation Splitting Vertex with a different aspect in the appendix.
Scalable Approaches
In this section, we solve the k-SDA problem on large scale social networks. Anonymization of large scale social networks with minimal information distortion is always quite challenging because directly enumerating possible solutions is computationally infeasible. Heuristically, anonymization problems can be solved by a one-step framework which directly adjusts a graph to satisfy the privacy requirements [3, 11, 13] , or by a two-step framework consisting of degree sequence anonymization and graph re-construction subjected to anonymized degree sequence [7] . For k-SDA, note that the degree sequence in the first step presents limited structural information, while deriving additional information in the first step is more computationally intensive such that an algorithm becomes less scalable. Therefore, in this paper, we design the algorithms to solve the k-SDA problem based on the one-step framework.
To ensure good scalability and achieve the anonymization with minimal information distortion, we propose three algorithms based on the following concepts. First, our algorithms anonymize the vertices one-by-one such that the graph anonymization can be efficiently achieved with only one scan of the vertices. Second, to efficiently minimize the total anonymization cost, we anonymize the vertices in orders of degrees and handle a set of vertices with similar degrees to avoid searching through the large amount of enumerations. Third, we propose two procedures, CREATION and MERGENCE, to anonymize each vertex v efficiently. Specifically, CREATION forms a new anonymous group for protecting v, such that other similar vertices that have not been considered can be anonymized via this new group and share the same degree with v. In addition to creating new anonymous groups for anonymization, MERGENCE lets v join an existing anonymous group if joining the group only incurs a small anonymization cost. Consequently, the above two procedures enable each vertex to be anonymized efficiently, and the graph anonymization thereby can be achieved with minimal information distortion.
In this paper, we propose three heuristic algorithms to solve k-SDA. The first algorithm, named EdgeConnect, specially aims at minimizing information distortion. Specifically, EdgeConnect applies operation Adding Edge alone since adding edges within a community does not destroy existing semantic information, such as friendships, and makes little changes over the whole graph. Note that, with Adding Edge alone, the degrees of vertices can only be increased. Therefore, EdgeConnect anonymizes the vertices in decreasing order of the degrees to have the vertices with large degrees first anonymized, so that we have more chances to achieve the anonymization of subsequent vertices without affecting existing anonymous groups. To provide more variety for anonymization, we extend EdgeConnect with operation Splitting Vertex and propose the second algorithm, named CreateBySplit. Algorithm CreateBySplit utilizes the same anonymization flow as EdgeConnect, and leverages Splitting Vertex only when the anonymization cannot be achieved by Adding Edge alone. The incorporation with Splitting Vertex can not only provide more chances to achieve the anonymization, but also cost little information distortion. Different from the previous two algorithms, which focus on minimizing the information distortion, the third algorithm, named MergeBySplit, is designed to guarantee the anonymization for the social networks that are difficult to be anonymized with respect to a high privacy level k. Different from CreateBySplit, here we anonymize the vertices in increasing order of the degrees, and the creation of the anonymous groups with small degrees thereby allows us to protect a vertex of any degree by operation Splitting Vertex. In other words, MergeBySplit is guaranteed to find the solutions for the social networks that are difficult to be anonymized.
Before we introduce these algorithms in details, we first define the anonymous group, which considers not only the number of vertices of the same degree, but also the distribution of the vertices over the communities.
Definition 2. An anonymous group of degree
Given a graph G(V, E, C), the objective is to assign every vertex v to a group g d with the minimal information distortion. In the followings, we present our algorithms in details.
Algorithm EdgeConnect
The EdgeConnect algorithm is designed for minimizing information distortion on large-scale graphs. For this purpose, the EdgeConnect algorithm applies operation Adding Edge to anonymize the vertices one-by-one in decreasing order of their degrees to avoid enumerating all possible combinations, which is computationally infeasible. One merit of EdgeConnect is that the existing information is never removed and the added local new edges within each community make little changes to the whole graph. Moreover, procedures CREATION and MER-GENCE are utilized in this algorithm, and any existing k-SDA group is never removed to avoid re-anonymizing the vertices and increasing the computation cost. Therefore, EdgeConnect has very good scalability as it is shown in our experiments.
We now describe the details. First we consider the procedure MERGENCE, which lets v be protected in an existing k-SDA group. For each vertex v, the cost for v to be in a group g d is
Therefore, to find a suitable k-SDA group for v, we derive the minimal MERGENCE cost for v as min d Cost MERGE (v, d) , where d is the degree of a k-SDA group g d . Next we consider the procedure CREATION, in which a new k-SDA group with the degree as d v will be created for v. For CREATION, our algorithm needs to find the vertices distributed in other k − 1 communities to join this new group. In other words, we let
where U is any subset of k vertices that have not been anonymized, including v. To avoid exploring every possible U , we sort the not-yet-anonymized vertices in each community according to degrees, and choose the vertex with the largest degree in each community for U . If |C| > k, only k of the above vertices with the largest degrees are selected to construct U such that |U | = k. Therefore, finding the anonymization costs for each vertex v are computationally efficient.
In our algorithm design, the not-yet-anonymized vertices in each community are sorted in the decreasing order of their degrees. Let s c denote the order set of the vertices for community c, and s c (i) be the vertex with the ith largest degree in c. We anonymize the vertices one-byone with MERGENCE and CREATION as follows. We first choose the largest degree vertex v among s 1 (1), . . . , s |C| (1) . Fig. 4 (a) with k set as 2. In the decreasing order of the degrees, the vertex orders are s 1 = cdabe and s 2 = f gkhji. Accordingly, the first considered vertex (the largest degree vertex) is c. From equation (4.7), the MERGENCE cost for c is infinity as there is no 2-SDA group. According to equation (4.9), the CREATION cost for c is 1, and the set U corresponding to the minimum cost consists of c and f (the first vertex in s c ). Therefore, vertex c is anonymized by CREATION and an edge is added between f and g. Consequently, a new 2-SDA group of degree 5 is generated, and the vertex orders are updated to s 1 = dabe and s 2 = gkhji. Fig. 4(b) shows the result after this iteration, and the anonymized vertices are shaded.
The above two procedures can anonymize every vertex with the minimal cost at each iteration. However, the anonymization of a vertex w may incur an added edge to connect w and another vertex v that has not been anonymized, so that the degree of v has already been increased when v is given to be anonymized. To further reduce the anonymization cost, we propose the edge-redirection operation to avoid the above case, by redirecting the existing added edge (w, v) to (w, x), where x has not been anonymized.
Definition 3. An edge-redirection operation is defined by one anonymized vertex w and two not-yet-anonymized vertices v and x in the same community as follows,
where E is the set of existing added edges, (w, v) ∈ E and (w, x) / ∈ E ∪ E.
The edge-redirection operation allows us to reduce the degree of v without affecting any anonymized vertex w in a k-SDA group. Therefore, let R v denote the set of edges that can be redirected away from v. We modify procedure MERGENCE as follows to allow v to join the group with a smaller degree, by redirecting some added edges incident to v. 
where U is any subset of k vertices that have not been anonymized, including v.
Therefore, with the edgeredirection operation and the two modified procedures, we are able to reuse the edges added previously to further reduce the anonymization cost.
In the following, we propose Algorithm EdgeConnect (Algorithm 1) based on the modified MERGENCE and CRE-ATION. For each vertex v, EdgeConnect first finds the set R v of added edges that can be redirected away from v. Then, the MERGENCE and CREATION costs for v are evaluated by (4.10) and (4.11). If the MERGENCE cost is smaller than the CREATION cost, the degree of v is increased by Adding Edges or decreased by the edge-redirection operation. Otherwise, EdgeConnect anonymizes v by creating a new k-SDA group with the vertices in U that minimizes the cost in (4.11).
EdgeConnect returns the anonymized graph G(V, E ∪ E, C)
and obtains the anonymization cost.
Example 2. We continue the example in Fig. 4 . However, procedures MERGENCE and CREATION utilize (4.10) and (4.11) here, instead of (4.7) and (4.9) in Example 1. In this case, c is still the first vertex to be anonymized. However, at the next iteration as shown in Fig. 4(b) , without the edge-redirection operation, g can only be anonymized by adding another edge to increase its degree to 5 (by MERGENCE), or by adding an edge between d and e to create a new 2-SDA group of degree 4 (by CREATION). In both ways, we need to add an edge to the graph. In contrast, the edge-redirection operation is able to avoid this additional edge. Specifically, for vertex g, EdgeConnect first finds R g = {(f, g)}. The CREATION cost for g is thus 0, and the set U that minimizes this cost is {d, g}. The MERGENCE cost for g is 1 because the only 2-SDA group is of degree 5. Therefore, EdgeConnect anonymizes g by creating a new 2-SDA group consisting of d and g, and redirecting the edge (f, g) to (f, h). Consequently, the edgeredirection operation enables us to anonymize g with a zero cost. Fig. 4(c) shows the result after the second iteration of anonymization, where the anonymized vertices belonging to the same 2-SDA groups are shaded in the same color. When EdgeConnect terminates, the final anonymous result is shown in Fig. 4(d) . The complexity of EdgeConnect is not that trivial as its basic algorithm, which anonymizes without the edgeredirection operation. However, from our experiments on large scale graphs, we can still observe that EdgeConnect anonymizes the graph in a linear time scale of the graph size.
Algorithm 1 The EdgeConnect Algorithm
Input: G(V, E, C), {s c }, k Output: G(V, E ∪ E, C), or "No" 1. v ← LargestDegreeVertex(s 1 (1), ..., s |C| (1)) 2. WHILE v = ∅ DO 3. R v ←RedirectableNewEdgeSet(v) 4. IF min d Cost MERGE (v, d) < min U Cost CREATE (v) 5. d ← d: min Cost MERGE (v, d) 6. (anon, G)=AdjustDegree(v, d)
Algorithm CreateBySplit
In the following, we extend Algorithm EdgeConnect with operation Splitting Vertex and propose Algorithm CreateBySplit. Compared to EdgeConnect, CreateBySplit is a more realizable solution because Splitting Vertex will increase the number of vertices in a community and provide more chances to achieve the anonymization. Specifically, Splitting Vertex replaces a vertex v with a set S v of substitute vertices, and redistributes incident edges of v to substitute vertices so that each substitute vertex presents partial truths of v. Therefore, Splitting Vertex will increase the number of vertices and incur higher information distortion than Adding Edge. To minimize the information distortion, Splitting Vertex is always regarded as the second choice and will be applied only if Adding Edge is not able to anonymize the social network.
In addition, to avoid creating too many vertices and increasing information distortion, we always use two substitute vertices v 1 and v 2 to replace v, and connect v 1 and v 2 with an edge. This approach can limit the increment of the length for the shortest path between any pair of vertices due to the split of a vertex.
Specifically, when Adding Edge is not able to anonymize the social network, CreateBySplit anonymizes a given vertex v by Splitting Vertex as follows. Let U be a vertex set consisting of v and other not-yet-anonymized vertices with the largest degrees in k − 1 different communities. As mentioned in Section 4.1, finding U is efficient as the vertices in each community are sorted in the decreasing order. CreateBySplit first determines a maximal degree d such that d ≤ d u for every vertex u ∈ U , and then generates a new k-SDA group of degree d by splitting the vertices in U . That is, for every vertex u ∈ U , d u > d, we replace u ∈ U with two substitute vertices u 1 and u 2 , i.e.,
and connect u 1 and u 2 with an edge, i.e.,
Moreover, the incident edges of u are randomly redistributed such that
Consequently, a new k-SDA group g d of degree d is generated. Every u 1 and every u in U with the degree equal to d are now anonymized vertices protected in the just generated k-SDA group g d . Every u 2 is then regarded as an usual vertex and is left to be anonymized subsequently as other vertices.
Algorithm MergeBySplit
In this section, we propose Algorithm MergeBySplit for the social networks that are difficult to be anonymized with respect to a high privacy level k. In CreateBySplit, even though Splitting Vertex can generate vertices to increase the possibility of anonymization for the social networks, the algorithm still cannot guarantee to find the solution of every instance of k-SDA. In contrast, MergeBySplit can anonymize every social network, even for the most difficult one.
Specifically, MergeBySplit anonymizes the vertices one-by-one in the increasing order of the degrees, and performs Splitting Vertex by allowing each vertex v to be split into more than two substitute vertices protected by the existing k-SDA groups. The rationale of this algorithm is that, the creation of k-SDA groups with small degrees allows us to protect any vertex v by splitting v into many cohorts of the generated k-SDA groups. In the worst case, we can split a vertex v of degree d v into d v substitute vertices of degree 1 to achieve the anonymization for an arbitrary k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |C|.
However, to reduce the information distortion, when we split a vertex v to cohorts of the existing k-SDA groups, we create the least number of substitute vertices based on dynamic programming as follows.
We now describe the details of Algorithm MergeBySplit. MergeBySplit sorts the not-yet-anonymized vertices in each community in the increasing order of the degrees. Let s c denote the order set of vertices in community c, and s c (i) be the vertex with the i-th smallest degree. At each iteration, we anonymize a vertex v with the smallest degree d v with procedures MERGENCE or CREATION as specified in Algorithm CreateBySplit. If it is too restrictive to anonymize v by Adding Edge and edge-redirection operations, we perform Splitting Vertex operation to anonymize v. Specifically, we replace v with a set S v of substitute vertices, i.e., 
Experiments 5.1 Data sets
In this paper, we conduct the experiments on both real data sets and synthetic data sets. All the graphs are pre-processed into simple graphs, i.e. unweighted undirected graphs without self-loops and multiple edges. The community identities of the vertices are either known as background knowledge or derived by community detection techniques 1 . DBLP: From the DBLP data set, we select out the authors who have ever published their papers in 20 top conferences such as AAAI, SIGIR, and ICDM, to name a few. The selected data set consists of 30,749 authors and there are 157,058 edges representing the co-author relationships. As people usually publish their papers in the conferences related to their interests, we regard the conference where an author published the most of his papers as the community of the author.
ca-CondMat: This data set shows the scientific collaborations between authors of papers in Condense Matter category from January 1993 to April 2003. The graph is available at the SNAP (Stanford Network Analysis Package) web page: http://snap.stanford.edu/data/, and consists of 23,133 vertices and 186,936 edges. An edge is built between two authors if they had co-authored a paper in that period. Note that the community (conference) information for this data set is not provided on the website. We then derive the community identifications by the METIS graph partition tool, as people in the same social network group or cluster tend to interact more intensely, i.e., each group or cluster often forms a dense subgraph.
AirPort: This graph is built by considering the 500 busiest US airports, and is available at http://www.db.cs. cmu.edu/db-site/Datasets/graphData/. In the graph, there are 500 vertices representing the airports and 2,980 edges between airports that have air travel connections. Due to the lack of background knowledge, we also derive the community identifications by the METIS graph partition tool.
In addition, we also use R-MAT graph model [2] to generate synthetic data sets. R-MAT graph model takes four parameters a, b, c and d, where a + b + c + d = 1, to generate graphs that match power-law degree distributions and smallworld properties, observed from many real social networks. In this paper, we use the default values of 0.45, 0.15, 0.15 and 0.25 for the four corresponding parameters, and generate graphs with the number of vertices ranging from 20,000 to 100,000 for testing the scalability of our algorithms.
Privacy Violation in Real Social Networks
In this paper, we show that the structural diversity is a real privacy protection issue against degree attacks in publishing social networks. The experiments are conducted on two real data sets, DBLP and ca-CondMat.
First, we study the problem of "whether many vertices of the same degree tend to gather in the same dense subgraph (community)". Note that if an attacker finds all the vertices of a particular degree appearing in certain subgraph (community), he can approximate privacy information such as the neighborhood and connectivity properties of a target. The privacy is thus violated. Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) show the percentages of vertices violating k-structural diversity (k-SD), i.e., the anonymized group that does not spread over k communities, on DBLP and ca-CondMat data sets, respectively. Consider, as an example, the case of k set as 10 on the DBLP data set. In both the original graph and the 10-degree anonymized graph, there are about 300 (1%) vertices violating 10-SD. As the value of k increases, the number of vertices violating k-SD grows significantly. The results on ca-CondMat data set show that k-degree anonymity sometimes makes this problem more seriously, because k-degree anonymity is designed to minimize the additional edges and does not aim to widely distribute the anonymous vertices of the same degree.
Next, we study the problem of "what are the degrees of the vertices violating k-SD"? In this experiment, we test the DBLP data set without anonymization and with 10-degree anonymization. Fig. 6 shows the number of communities containing vertices of a particular degree. Consider the case of 10-SD. The data points with the community numbers less than 10 (below the horizontal dashed line) violate 10-SD. It is worth to mention that the vertices violating 10-SD are with large degrees. This means that active people have higher risks of their privacy being violated.
The experimental results show that the structural diversity is a real privacy protection issue against degree attacks, especially for the vertices of large degrees. Moreover, graphs protected by k-degree anonymity may still violate k-SD as k-degree anonymity is not design for k-SDA problem. 
Anonymization Performance
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the EdgeConnect (EC), CreateBySplit (CBS) and MergeBySplit (MBS) algorithms. Specifically, we first compare the anonymization costs of the EdgeConnect algorithm with the optimal solution. Next, we study the utility of anonymized graphs from the clustering coefficient (CC) and average path length (APL). Third, we report the number of new edges, the number of vertices split, and the average number of substitute vertices for each vertex split in the three algorithms. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithms.
Difference from Optimal Solution
Note that finding the optimal solution is computationally infeasible on large scale data sets. Therefore, we compare the anonymization cost of the EdgeConnect algorithm with the optimal solution on AirPort data set, while the optimal solution is obtained with the proposed formulation using CPLEX 2 . In the experiment, we achieve the 2-structural diversity given the number of communities varying from 3 to 10, 15 and 25. Fig. 7 shows the numbers of new edges introduced in the anonymized graph. The EdgeConnect algorithm incurs only a few additional edges compared to the optimal solution. However, as we can see later, the EdgeConnect algorithm can scale well to large data sets. 
Utility Studies from CC and APL
We then study the utility of anonymized graphs from the clustering coefficient (CC) and average path length between vertex pairs (APL) on DBLP, ca-CondMat and AirPort data sets. In this experiment, we also compare our three algorithms with kdegree anonymity 3 . Fig.  8 shows the clustering coefficients of the anonymized graphs as a function of k. First, note that EdgeConnect can almost perfectly preserve the clustering coefficient of the original graphs on three data sets. This is because the EdgeConnect only adds new edges within communities for anonymization and thus preserves much of the community structures. The trade-off is that, on ca-CondMat and AirPort data sets, EdgeConnect anonymizes the graph successfully only when k is (relatively) small. As an extension, the CreateBySplit algorithm has more chance to achieve the anonymization when k becomes larger as shown in Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 8(c) , while the cost is the decrease in the CC values (because some vertices are split). Nonetheless, CreateBySplit performs well on large scale data sets as shown in Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) . On these data sets, MergeBySplit is the algorithm guaranteeing to achieve k-SDA for any privacy level k. The cost of MergeBySplit is that, when k gets closer to the total number of communities in the graphs, MergeBySplit may somehow weaken the cohesiveness of the large communities by Splitting Vertex. Finally, we also compare our algorithms with k-degree anonymity. As shown in Fig. 8 , k-degree anonymity does not consider the community struc-tures in the anonymization process and thus may weaken the communities on any data sets. Figure 9 shows the average path lengths between vertex pairs of the anonymized graphs as a function of k. EdgeConnect slightly decreases the APL values because edges within communities are added for anonymization. As an extension, CreateBySplit may decrease the APL values as shown in Fig.  9(a) and Fig. 9(b) , or increase the APL values as shown in Fig. 9(c) . This is because CreateBySplit not only introduces new edges within communities but also allows to split vertices, and the substitute vertices generated from the splitting of a vertex are connected. For the guarantee of successful anonymization, MergeBySplit generates k-SDA groups of small degrees first and tends to split more vertices. The cost of this approach is thus to increase the APL values. Finally, k-degree anonymity performs quite well on DBLP data set as shown in Fig. 9(a) because only a few edges are added for anonymization. On ca-CondMat and AirPort data sets, however, EdgeConnect and CreateBySplit perform better than kdegree anonymity since we consider the community structures and add edges within communities.
Accordingly, we recommend the CreateBySplit algorithm as the preferred solution among the three approaches for two reasons. First, when k is relatively small to the number of communities in the graph, CreateBySplit can anonymize the graph to become structural diverse and preserve the original graphs as much as EdgeConnect. Second, even when k becomes a little bit larger, CreateBySplit minimizes the split of vertices and thus preserves the original graphs better than MergeBySplit. The MergeBySplit algorithm is the choice if the CreateBySplit algorithm fails to generate the anonymized graph.
Number of New Edges, Vertices Split and Substitute Vertices
We now report (a) the ratio of the number of new edges to the original number of edges, (b) the ratio of the number of vertices split to the original number of vertices, and (c) the average number of substitute vertices for a vertex split, of the anonymized graphs as functions of k. Due to the limit of the space, we only show the results on DBLP data set in Fig. 10 , while the other two data sets show similar tendencies.
First, as shown in Fig. 10(a) , when the value of k is smaller than 50% of the number of communities, the EdgeConnect/CreateBySplit algorithm achieves the kstructural diversity by adding less than 5% new edges in the anonymized graph. Second, compare the results in Fig. 10(a) with Fig. 10(b) . When k becomes larger, CreateBySplit tends to add new edges rather than to split the vertices. On the contrary, MergeBySplit tends to split vertices rather than to add new edges. This is because the two approaches scan the degree sequences and create the anonymous groups of particular degrees in the reverse orders. In a simple graph, there are more chances to add new edges for the anonymization when the vertices are anonymized in the decreasing order of the degrees. Third, Fig. 10(c) shows that MergeBySplit uses a small set of substitute vertices for each vertex that has been split. Therefore, MergeBySplit minimizes the information distortion under the guarantee of successful anonymization.
Scalability
We demonstrate the execution efficiency of our algorithms on synthetic data sets with the number of vertices ranging from 20,000 to 100,000. The experimental environment is a Debian GNU/Linux server with double dual-core 2.4 GHz Opteron processors and 4GB RAM. Fig.  11 shows that the execution time grows as the value of k increases. Nonetheless, our algorithms can anonymize the graph to satisfy k-structural diversity in a linear time scale of the graph size.
Conclusions
In this paper, we formulated a new problem, k-Structural Diversity Anonymization (k-SDA), which protects the community identity of each individual in publishing social networks. We proposed an Integer Programming formulation to find the optimal solutions to k-SDA for small cases, and devised three novel algorithms to solve the large instances of k-SDA. The experiments on real data sets show that our approaches can ensure the k-structural diversity with limited anonymization costs. In this case, these vertices are not actually split from v, and we regard these vertices inactive in S v . In the extreme case, if only one vertex in S v is active and has incident edges, the vertex represents v in our formulation, and v is actually not split in k-SDA. In our formulation, to avoid missing the globally optimal solutions, S v has |E v | candidate substitute vertices, and only active substitute vertices are included or added to G in the solutions for users. The objective function of k-SDA with both operations is as follows. The first part represents the cost from operation Splitting Vertex, and note that no cost is incurred if no such operation is performed, i.e., there is only one active substitute vertex in S u for each u in V . The last term corresponds to the cost from operation Adding Edge. Moreover, the edges between the substitute vertices of the same vertex, β u,i,j , induce no cost. The problem has the following constraints, (3.5) , and (3.6). Constraint (3.2) does not hold here because each substitute vertex can have a single incident original edge or a large number of adding edges connected to many other substitute vertices. Moreover, the first term in constraint (A.2) is different from the one in (3.3). In constraint (3.3), every original edge in E is connected to vertex u. In contrast, here we allow the edges in E u to be distributed to the substitute vertices of u, and also the edges between substitute vertices of u. The lefthand-side of (A.2) thereby finds the degree of each substitute vertex i of u.
Constraints (A.6)-(A.10) allocate the original edges in E to substitute vertices and identify the corresponding active substitute vertices. Constraint (A.6) ensures that each original edge connecting vertices u and v in k-SDA must connect a substitute vertex of u and a substitute vertex of v here. Constraint (A.7) guarantees that a substitute vertex is active if the vertex has a least one incident edge in E. Otherwise, constraint (A.8) enforces the vertex to be inactive. In this case, the last two constraints also prohibit the vertex from adding any new incident edge.
